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Abstract 
Norwegian business spending on R&D is low by OECD standards. To stimulate business R&D, in 
2002 the Norwegian government introduced a tax-based incentive, SkatteFUNN. We analyze the 
effects of SkatteFUNN on the likelihood of innovating and patenting. Using a rich database for 
Norwegian firms, we find that projects receiving tax credits result in the development of new 
production processes and to some extent the development of new products for the firm. Firms that 
collaborate with other firms are more likely to be successful in their innovation activities. However, 
the scheme does not appear to contribute to innovations in the form of new products for the market or 
patenting. 
Keywords: Tax credits; R&D; Patenting; Innovation; Self-selection. 
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1. Introduction 
Both economic theory and empirical evidence support the view that R&D plays a vital role in 
raising productivity on a sustainable basis (see, e.g., Griliches, 1992, and Romer, 1990). The 
social return on R&D investment is often higher than the private return to the investing firm. 
Thus, one can justify policy interventions if a well-designed intervention scheme can be 
implemented. Since the 1990s, OECD countries have tended to rely on fiscal policy 
incentives to promote R&D spending in the business sector. In 1996, 12 OECD countries 
offered tax incentives for R&D expenses; by 2004 this number had increased to 18, with 
Norway as one of the newcomers. 
R&D incentives are designed in many different ways. Some countries offer incremental 
schemes targeting only increases in R&D expenses, while others have volume-based 
incentives. A few countries have both. Although more countries have introduced tax 
incentives over time, no consensus exists as to what is best practice. Evaluation of the 
incentives in various countries may help determine which policies or policy mixes work well. 
R&D spending in the Norwegian business sector as a share of GDP is below the OECD 
average. To stimulate private R&D investment, the Norwegian government has traditionally 
used direct R&D subsidies. In 2002 this policy was supplemented with an R&D tax credit 
scheme — SkatteFUNN — for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which by 2003 
became available to all firms.1 SkatteFUNN provides a volume-based tax credit to firms with 
an R&D project that the Research Council of Norway (RCN) has approved. A tax credit of 18 
percent (20 percent for SMEs) of R&D costs for the approved project is deductible from the 
firm’s income tax, with a project cost cap roughly equal to half a million Euros. If the firm 
does not pay any tax or pays less tax than the tax credit, the credit is paid to the firm as if it 
were a grant. The scheme provides an incentive for increased R&D mainly to firms with small 
R&D projects for which the cap in the tax credit is not binding. Thus it lowers the marginal 
                                                 
1 The SkatteFUNN scheme is one of the most generous tax credit systems among OECD countries according to OECD (2007, 
cf. Figure 5.1). The tax credit contains no sector or regional bias and is thus neutral between qualifying projects; and region, 
sector and the tax position of qualifying firms. Even if SkatteFUNN is available to all firms, it induced a significant increase 
of R&D subsidies to small firms. The official R&D statistics show that the Norwegian government spent 2.1 billion NOK 
(250 mill. Euro) on public subsidies to R&D in 2008 (cf. RCN, 2010).  About 1 billion was given as tax subsidies through the 
SkatteFUNN scheme, the rest, 1.1 billion, was given as direct grants. About 40 percent of the SkatteFUNN subsidies (400 
mill. NOK) were given to firms with less than 5 employees in 2008. 
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cost of R&D for low spenders more than for firms with large R&D expenditures. A summary 
of main findings from the evaluation of the scheme is given in Cappelen et al. (2010). 
In this paper we study the effects of SkatteFUNN on firms’ innovation activities and 
patenting. We analyze three types of innovations: a new (or improved) product for the firm, a 
new (or improved) product for the market, and a new (or improved) production process. We 
also have information on patent applications. We focus on the following three questions 
which are of general interest for research policy. 
First, how is the introduction of innovations related to R&D? While R&D obviously is an 
important factor behind innovation, it is not the only one. The availability of high–skilled 
workers is another important factor. Our data reveal that formal R&D is not a necessary 
condition for innovation. 
Second, does SkatteFUNN lead to more innovations? Hægeland and Møen (2007) find that 
firms receiving support through SkatteFUNN are more likely to increase their R&D 
investments than other firms. The question remains whether there is a causal relation between 
SkatteFUNN and firms’ innovations. 
Third, does the answer to the third question depend on type of innovation? One important 
reason for government intervention in the market for R&D is to create spillovers. If firms 
receiving subsidies mainly innovate in the form of products that are new for the firm, but not 
for the market (i.e., imitate other firms), it is not clear that the scheme will reach those R&D 
activities with the largest potential for spillovers. Thus, to assess the impact of tax credits on 
innovation is important from the point of view of research policy. To our knowledge, the 
existing literature has addressed this issue only to a limited degree. 
For the analysis, we use Norwegian micro data covering firms included in the 2001 and 2004 
innovation surveys (CIS3 and CIS4). These surveys contain information on the inputs and 
outputs of firms’ innovative activities, e.g., whether firms have introduced product or process 
innovations and whether they have applied for a patent over the three-year period before each 
survey. The 2001 survey covers the three years before the introduction of SkatteFUNN 
(1999–2001), while the 2004 survey covers the three years following the introduction of 
SkatteFUNN (2002–2004). Since about 2/3 of the firms are included in both surveys (see 
Section 3), we are able to obtain a panel data set from these survey data. By supplementing 
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the data with information from the (annual) R&D survey and different registers, we obtain 
two three-year periods with data on the innovation variables and six years of observations on 
R&D and other variables. 
Our modeling framework is influenced by Griliches (1990), Crepon et al. (1998) and Parisi et 
al. (2006). The main idea in this literature is that by investing in R&D, the firm accumulates 
R&D capital, which plays an important role in its innovation activities. Using binary 
regression models, we model the probability of innovating and patenting as function of the 
firm’s R&D capital stock at the beginning of each three year period, whether it participated in 
SkatteFUNN or not, and different firm characteristics (size, industry, share of high–skilled 
workers, etc.). Even if R&D investments are simultaneously determined with innovation 
activities, the timing of our R&D variable allows us to consider the R&D capital stock as 
predetermined. Moreover, access to panel data and not just repeated cross-sections gives us an 
opportunity to estimate models that explicitly take into account the persistence of innovation 
activities within firms by conditioning on past innovation and patenting activities. To identify 
causal effects of SkatteFUNN, we model the probability of obtaining SkatteFUNN and the 
probability of innovations simultaneously, while carefully examining the validity of 
identifying restrictions. 
Our results show that the SkatteFUNN scheme contributes to the development of new 
production processes and, to some extent, to the development of new products for the firm. 
Firms that collaborate with other firms in their R&D activities are more likely to innovate. 
However, the scheme does not appear to contribute to innovations in the form of new 
products for the market or more patenting. 
The structure of our paper is as follows. Section 2 describes our study in the context of the 
existing literature. Section 3 presents the data and provides descriptive statistics on R&D, 
innovations and patent applications. Section 4 discusses our identification strategy and 
describes the model framework, while Section 5 presents the results. Finally, Section 6 
concludes and raises policy issues that are relevant for the design of tax credit schemes in 
general. 
5 
2. Our study in the context of the existing literature 
There exists a relatively large literature evaluating the effects of public R&D subsidy 
programs on firms’ R&D investment. The early literature is surveyd in Hall and van Reenen 
(2000) while Mairesse and Mohnen (2010) give an overview of later contributions. Some 
examples include Wallsten (2000), who examined the U.S. Small Business Innovation 
Research program, Lach (2000), who studied an Israeli scheme of R&D subsidies for 
manufacturing firms, and Almus and Czarnitzki (2003), who studied a German R&D subsidy 
program and Lokshin and Mohnen (2007), who analyzed a tax credit scheme in the 
Netherlands. Most of these studies focus on possible crowding-out effects; i.e., whether the 
firms substitute their private R&D investments with public R&D funding. This question has 
been examined in the context of the Norwegian SkatteFUNN scheme by Hægeland and Møen 
(2007), and the main findings are summarized in Cappelen et al. (2010). Few researchers have 
examined the effects on output measures, such as patents and innovations. One exception is 
the evaluation of the Dutch R&D subsidy program (WBSO); cf. de Jong and Verhoeven 
(2007), who analyzed how WBSO has influenced the proportion of turnover from sales of 
new products and services. They reported a significant positive effect of WBSO on their 
output measure but, like most other studies in this area, they did not pay attention to selection 
problems. As pointed out by, for instance, Klette et al. (2000) and David et al. (2002), 
controlling for self-selection is a prerequisite for valid inference.  
In general, when evaluating the treatment effects of a public policy program, one must 
address a counterfactual question: what is the change in the outcome variable given treatment, 
say Y(1), compared to the potential outcome in the case of non-treatment, )0(Y ? We cannot 
answer this question just by regressing the observed outcome, Y (e.g., the number of patent 
applications), on a dummy for whether the unit is treated ( 1D = ) or non-treated ( 0D = ). The 
reason is that observed and unobserved variables that affect the dependent variable, Y, may 
also affect the outcome of D; i.e., we may have a case of self-selection into the program. In 
the example with SkatteFUNN, firms that already are engaged in R&D activities have a larger 
probability of applying for R&D subsidies than other firms; i.e., there is “selection based on 
observables”. There may also be “selection based on unobservables”. For example, the 
decision to apply for SkatteFUNN may be based on the (unobserved) probability of success 
for already ongoing projects. Ignoring selection problems may lead to seriously biased 
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estimates of causal effects. Indeed, our study shows that the way we control for self-selection 
has a major impact on the results. 
One approach to the self-selection problem is propensity score matching, which is based on 
the assumption that there exists a vector of exogenous covariates, X , such that (0)Y  and 
(1)Y  are independent of D given X  (conditional independence). According to a result in 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), a treated firm and a nontreated firm can be matched if they 
have identical probability of participating in the program, given X. That is, they can be 
considered as if they were equal in all other respects (except for an additive error term). The 
difference in Y can then be calculated for all matched pairs and the average value of these 
differences is a valid estimator of the average treatment effect among the treated. This idea 
was applied by Almus and Czarnitzki (2003). However, this approach depends on the 
assumption of an additive error term in the equation for Y (the outcome equation), and 
therefore is not appropriate when Y is a categorical variable. Even more fundamentally, we 
will argue that the conditional independence (“selection on observables”) assumption is not 
valid for the Norwegian SkatteFUNN scheme. 
To control for “selection on unobservables”, Busom (2000) applies a two-stage or control 
function approach based on Heckman (1976, 1979). In her approach, an equation for whether 
firms participate in a public funding program is estimated in the first stage, from which 
suitable variables (“control functions”) are computed and included as additional regressors 
when estimating the effects of the program in the second stage. Selection based on 
unobservables is also essential in the model of Crepon et al. (1998), often referred to as the 
CDM model. The CDM model assumes that there exists an unobserved variable for each firm 
that determines the firm’s decision to undertake R&D or not. If the unobserved variable 
exceeds some threshold, the firm will undertake a positive amount of R&D. Because R&D is 
an endogenous explanatory variable, it is replaced by its predicted value obtained in the first 
stage of the CDM model. In the second stage, various innovation variables (patenting, share 
of innovative sales out of total sales, etc.) are modeled conditional on the R&D activity of the 
firm. In addition, variables such as capital intensity, firm size, industry dummies, and demand 
pull and technology push factors are used as covariates. Although Crepon et al. (1998) are not 
concerned with policy evaluation per se, they address selectivity issues that are highly 
relevant also in an evaluation context. As we discuss later, it is likely that access to various 
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forms of external funding is endogenous to the firm and may impair the estimated effects of 
policy interventions.  
Our approach can be seen as combining the CDM model with the control-function 
methodology of Busom (2000), although there are some notable differences. First, access to 
panel data enables us to condition on lagged innovation and patenting variables, both in the 
equation determining participation in SkatteFUNN and in the outcome equations for 
innovations and patenting. This enables us to take into account the possibility of persistence 
in R&D and innovation, cf. Hall et al. (1986) and results surveyed by Mairesse and Mohnen 
(2010). Second, because we use nonlinear binary-regression models in the second stage, the 
standard control function approach cannot be applied directly as in Busom (2000). Instead we 
consider a modification of this approach, building on the likelihood based framework 
developed in Dagsvik et al. (2011). In fact, our approach applies two of the suggestions made 
by Mairesse and Mohnen (2010) on how to make progress in innovation analyses; we use 
panel data and merge innovation surveys with a rich dataset based on administrative registers. 
Without these two additions our econometric approach would not be feasible.   
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics on R&D, innovations and patents 
3.1 Data and variables construction 
For the analysis, we use Norwegian micro data on firms included in the 2001 and 2004 
innovation surveys, covering the three-year periods 1999–2001 and 2002–2004, respectively. 
These data are collected by Statistics Norway as a part of the annual R&D survey (we refer to 
them as R&D statistics). They contain detailed information on firms’ R&D and innovation 
activities, including total R&D expenditures (divided into intramural R&D and extramural 
R&D services), whether the firm has introduced a new product (for the firm or for the market) 
or a process innovation, and whether it has applied for a patent over the corresponding three 
year period (henceforth referred to as a subperiod). The sample for the survey is selected 
using a stratified method for firms with 10–50 employees, whereas all firms with more than 
50 employees are included. The strata are based on industry classification (NACE codes) and 
firm size. Each survey contains about 5000 firms. By supplementing these data with 
information from the Tax Register, the Register of Employers and Employees (REE) and the 
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National Education Database (NED), we obtain a panel of firms with observations on 
innovation outcomes, R&D and other variables over a time span of six years. Table 1 presents 
an overview of the main variables and the data sources applied in our study. 
Table 1.  
Overview over variables and data sources. 
Variable Definition Data source(s) 
inpdt 1 if firm has introduced a new product for the firm in 
the given subperiod, 0 else 
R&D statistics 
inmar 1 if firm has introduced a new product for the market 
in the given subperiod, 0 else 
R&D statistics 
inpcs 1 if firm has introduced a new production process in 
the given subperiod, 0 else 
R&D statistics 
d_patent 1 if firm has applied for a patent in the given 
subperiod, 0 else 
R&D statistics 
R R&D investment in the given year R&D statistics 
d_R 1 if R > 0 in at least one year in the given subperiod, 0 
else 
R&D statistics 
RK R&D capital stock at the end of the given year R&D statistics 
rk R&D capital intensity: RK/man-hour R&D statistics/REE 
coopf 1 if firm cooperated with another firm in R&D in the 
given subperiod, 0 else 
R&D statistics 
coopu 1 if firm cooperated with a university or research 
institute in R&D in the given subperiod, 0 else 
R&D statistics 
d_SFS 1 if the firm obtained SkatteFUNN subsidies in at least 
one year in the given subperiod, 0 else 
Tax register 
ac Share of man-hours worked by employees with 
academic education (17 or more years of education) 
REE/NED 
Note: Subperiod includes the last three years. 
 
The first three variables in Table 1, inpdt, inmar and inpcs, are dummy variables indicating 
whether the firm has introduced a new product for the firm, a new product for the market or a 
new production process (during the corresponding subperiod), while the dummy variable 
d_patent indicates whether the firm has applied for a patent during the same period. All these 
variables are measures of how innovative the firm is and are considered as dependent 
variables in our analysis. 
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R&D investment, R, is annual R&D investment as it is reported in the questionnaire, deflated 
by the R&D deflator used in the national accounts2. The dummy variable d_R indicates 
whether the firm has invested in R&D in at least one year during the last three years. 
The volume of R&D capital stock at the end of a given year t, tRK , is computed by the 
perpetual inventory method using a constant rate of depreciation (δ = 0.15). That is: 
 1(1 ) , 1,2,...t t tRK RK R tδ −= − + = . 
Following Hall and Mairesse (1995), the benchmark for the R&D capital stock at the 
beginning of the observation period for a given firm, RK0, is calculated as if it were the result 
of an infinite R&D investment series, * tR − , 0,1,2...t = , with a fixed presample growth rate g 
= 0.05. That is: 
 * * *0 1 1/( ) with (1 ) , 0,1,2,...t tRK R g R g R tδ − + −= + = + = , 
(cf. equation (5) in Hall and Mairesse, 1995). We can interpret tR*  as the equilibrium growth 
path for the firm’s R&D investments. Hall and Mairesse (1995) use the estimator *1 1R R= , 
which, however, is vulnerable to measurement errors if the actual investment series tR  for 
1≤t  deviates from the constant growth rate assumption near 1=t  (more distant historic 
values carry less weight due to discounting). We instead apply a more robust estimator by 
averaging investment observations in the neighborhood of 1=t : *1 1/ ttR T R= ∑ . Here T is 
the number of observations on the given firm, whereas the summation is over all t for which 
data are available3. This estimator is obviously less influenced by random fluctuations in the 
observed investment series. R&D capital intensity, rk, is calculated as the R&D capital stock 
per man-hour, where the latter is the sum of all man-hours in the firm. 
The two variables, coopf and coopu, indicate if the firm cooperated with another firm (coopf) 
or with a university or research institute (coopu) when carrying out R&D during the last three 
                                                 
2 More than 60 percent of total R&D expenditures are made up of labor costs. 
3 We use all available data on the firm’s R&D investments from the biannual 1993–1999 R&D surveys, and the annual 2001–
2005 R&D surveys. Although the sample we analyze in this paper is restricted to 1999–2004, we also utilize the out-of-
sample data to estimate the initial R&D capital stock, if available for the given firm. 
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years. The dummy variable d_SFS indicates whether the firm obtained a SkatteFUNN subsidy 
in at least one year during the corresponding subperiod. It may have a positive value only for 
the second subperiod, 2002–2004, because SkatteFUNN was introduced in 2002. 
For each firm, we distinguish between two types of employees: those with academic 
education (corresponding to a Master or PhD level of education) and those without. We 
assume that the former group is particularly relevant to the R&D activity in the firm. The 
variable ac is defined as the number of man-hours worked by employees with academic 
education divided by the total number of man-hours in the firm. 
The 2001 and 2004 innovation surveys include 3896 and 4655 firms, respectively. After 
merging them and excluding firms with incomplete information on the variables of interest, 
we obtain a reduced unbalanced panel of 2476 firms. Keeping only firms included in both 
surveys gives us a balanced panel of 1689 firms.  
Table 2.  
Mean values of key variables. 
 1999–2001 2002–2004 
Number of firms 1689 1689 
rk 0.13 (0.35) 0.13 (0.38) 
ac 5.9% 6.4% 
   
Share of firms with d_R = 1 39.8% 53.6% 
rk | d_R = 1 0.27 (0.51) 0.24 (0.50) 
ac| d_R = 1 9.3% 9.0% 
   
Share of firms with all SFS > 0 – 10.5% 
Share of firms with d_SFS = 1 – 36.2% 
Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis; all means are over three year periods; all SFS > 0 indicates that the firm 
obtained SkatteFUNN subsidy each year during the corresponding three-year period. 
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics on R&D, innovations and patents 
For our sample of firms, Table 2 reports the mean (and standard deviation) for R&D capital 
intensity, rk, and the share of man-hours worked by employees with academic education, ac, 
in the two subperiods. We compute these measures both for the total sample of firms and for 
the subsample of firms that had some R&D activity during the relevant subperiod (d_R = 1).  
Not surprisingly, the share of man-hours worked by employees with academic education, ac, 
is higher for the firms that invested in R&D. Moreover, more firms invested in R&D (d_R = 
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1) in the second subperiod; i.e., about 40 percent in 1999–2001 versus about 54 percent in 
2002–2004. Turning to the SkatteFUNN variables, we see that 10.5 percent of the firms in the 
sample received a tax subsidy each year in 2002–2004 (all SFS > 0). The share of firms who 
received a subsidy at least once during 2002–2004 (d_SFS = 1) is much higher; i.e., 36.2 
percent. 
Table 3.  
The share of innovative firms by the type of innovation and patenting, percent. 
 1999–2001 2002–2004 
New product for the firm (inpdt) 41.2 36.7 
New product for market (inmar) 18.6 19.5 
New production process (inpcs) 33.3 22.4 
Applied for a patent (d_patent) 13.9 13.9 
   
inpdt | d_R = 1 81.0 61.6 
inmar | d_R = 1 39.4 33.9 
inpcs | d_R = 1 62.2 38.4 
patent | d_R = 1 28.7 23.3 
   
inpdt | d_SFS = 1 – 65.8 
inmar | d_SFS = 1 – 38.6 
inpces | d_SFS = 1 – 39.9 
d_patent | d_SFS = 1 – 24.6 
Note: n = 1689 firms in each subperiod. 
Table 3 gives information about the firms’ innovation and patenting activities in 1999–2001 
and 2002–2004. The first group of rows reports, separately for each subperiod, the share of 
innovative firms by different types of innovations and patent application. The next two groups 
of rows report the share of innovative firms in the two subsamples – the firms carrying out 
some R&D activity (d_R = 1) and the SkatteFUNN firms (d_SFS = 1), respectively. One can 
see that the most frequent type of innovation for Norwegian firms is a new product for the 
firm, followed by a new production process. Less than 20 percent of these firms innovate in 
the form of a new product for the market and only about 14 percent apply for a patent. Firms 
with positive R&D investments and SkatteFUNN firms are more innovative than other firms 
in both subperiods. There is less innovation during 2002-2004 than during 1999-2001. This 
could be the result of the economic downturn that Norway experienced in the aftermath of the 
ICT-bubble in 2001, leading to unfavorable demand conditions. It is consistent with the 
original CDM-model of Crepon et al. (1998) that demand conditions affect innovation.  
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4. Econometric approach 
The main purpose of our analysis is to estimate the causal effect of SkatteFUNN on the 
probability of the various types of innovations. In many empirical analyses, e.g., using the 
CDM model, innovations are considered as a type of output of a production function, with 
R&D capital as one of the input factors. The impact of a tax credit on the innovation output of 
the firms is then assumed to depend on two things: (i) how much the tax credit increases R&D 
investment (or R&D intensity) compared to a hypothetical situation without any tax credit, 
and (ii) whether this (marginal) investment leads to an innovation or not. Ideally, we should 
be able to observe for each firm both (i) and (ii). In practice, we only observe whether a firm 
participates in SkatteFUNN or not, and whether it innovates or not.  
In principle, we could model the joint relation between R&D subsidies, R&D investment and 
innovation output. This is done in, for instance, Czarnitzki and Licht (2006) and Hussinger 
(2008), who examine the impact of subsidies on R&D expenditures in a first stage of a two-
stage procedure, and then the impact of the estimated incremental R&D on innovative output 
in the second stage. Our approach, however, is more modest aiming only to identify the 
marginal effect of the tax credit scheme on the innovation output. Nevertheless, we do take 
R&D intensity into account, since we condition on the firm’s R&D capital stock at the 
beginning of the subperiod (which is determined before the tax credit program starts). We 
believe that a marginal model is adequate in our situation for several reasons. First, our data 
clearly reject the assumption of a recursive structure underlying a standard two-stage-
procedure: many firms report innovative output without carrying out formal R&D. 4 Thus 
positive R&D investment (as measured in the data) is not a necessary condition for 
innovations. Secondly, the relation between R&D subsidies and (incremental) R&D is 
notoriously hard to measure and it is far from obvious that a joint model (with two outcome 
equations instead of one) would give more accurate answers to our questions. Thirdly, an 
increase in R&D expenditures as a result of subsidies may not fully reflect a quantity increase. 
For example, it has been documented in Norway that subsidies led to increasing wages of 
R&D workers in the industries mostly affected by the SkatteFUNN program and also to re-
                                                 
4 The Norwegian business sector as a whole reported innovation costs to be 22 bill. NOK in 2004, whereas total R&D 
investments were 13 bill. NOK. Clearly, firms regard innovation activities and expenditures as comprising a wider set of 
activities than R&D. 
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labeling of ordinary operating costs as R&D expenditures.5 Finally, it is an interesting policy 
question per se whether innovative output increases as a consequence of the R&D subsidy 
program: If a positive effect on innovations can be identified, reported increases in reported 
R&D expenditures cannot be driven solely by re-labeling and price effects.  
We will now turn to our formal models. The dependent variable, tY , is binary and takes the 
value 1 (“success”) or 0 (“failure”). With reference to the variable definitions in Table 1, we 
will study four types of innovations: (i) tY = “d_patent”, (ii) tY =  “inpdt”, (iii) tY =  “inmar”, 
and (iv) tY =  “inpcs”. In the case (i), tY = 1 means that the firm applied for at least one patent 
in subperiod t. In the cases (ii)–(iv), tY = 1 means that the corresponding type of innovation 
occurred in subperiod t. The time index t takes two values: 1t =  refers to the subperiod 1999–
2001 (the three years before the introduction of SkatteFUNN), while t = 2 refers to the 
subperiod 2002–2004 (the three years following the introduction of SkatteFUNN in 2002). 
Our empirical analyses are based on three different versions of binary regression. The first 
version should be considered as merely providing descriptive statistics. Here tY  is regressed 
on a vector of explanatory variables, tX : 
(1) 1Pr( 1| )
1 exp( )t t t
Y X
X β
= =
+ −
. 
 
That is, (1) is a logit model, where Pr( 1| )t tY X=  denotes the probability of “success” for a 
given firm in period t given tX , where tX  is a (row) vector of independent variables 
(covariates) and β  is the corresponding (column) vector of regression coefficients. The 
vector tX  contains dummies for subperiod 1 or 2; intervals for the number of employees: 
[10,20), [20,50), )100,50[ and 100≥ ; industry (construction, retail trade, transportation 
services, other services and different manufacturing groups)6; whether the firm obtained 
                                                 
5 See http://www.ssb.no/skattefunn/rapp_200802_en.pdf. 
 
6 All industry definitions and the definition of 11 manufacturing groups are based on NACE-codes, SN2002. 
14 
SkatteFUNN subsidies (d_SFS); and whether the firm cooperates with other firms (coopf) 
and/or a university or research institute (coopu) when carrying out R&D. Through the 
interaction terms d_SFS × coopf and d_SFS × coopu, we also allow the effect of SkatteFUNN 
to depend on whether the firm has such cooperation or not. Finally, tX  contains two 
continuous regressors: the share of total man-hours by employees with academic education 
(ac) and R&D capital per man-hour (rk). 
The date of the variables in tX  refers, in most cases, to the beginning of subperiod t. For 
example, rk in subperiod t = 1 refers to the R&D capital per man-hour in 1999. We choose 
this dating to reduce the potential endogeneity problem that occurs if the right-hand side 
variables can be adjusted as a consequence of changes in the dependent variable, tY . For 
example, if the firm increases its R&D investment or initiate a joint research project with 
another firm as a consequence of an innovation. The one exception to this dating convention 
regards the dummy variable d_SFS, which is one if the firm received SkatteFUNN subsidies 
during the three year period t and zero otherwise. 
Valid statistical inference in the framework of equation (1) requires that d_SFS is independent 
of tY  given the covariates, tX (i.e., conditional independence). This assumption will not be 
fulfilled if the firms that independently of SkatteFUNN would have had the highest number of 
patents or innovations also have the highest probability of participating in SkatteFUNN (given 
the observable exogenous variables). There are certainly reasons to believe that this is the 
case. Another shortcoming of specification (1) is that it does not take into account the 
persistence of innovation activities at the firm level; that the dependent variable, tY , may 
depend on 1tY −  (given the explanatory variables tX ).7 For example, we expect, ceteris 
paribus, that the probability of innovating in the second subperiod ( 2 1Y = ) is larger for firms 
that innovated in the first subperiod ( 1 1Y = ) than for those that did not ( 1 0Y = ). 
 
In our second econometric specification, we attempt to address these concerns by assuming 
that  
                                                 
7 Earlier studies have shown that innovation is a quite persistent feature of firms cf. Peters (2007). 
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(2) 
{ }2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2
1Pr( 1 | , )
1 exp -( ( _ ) )
Y X Y
X Y d SFS Yβ α α
= =
+ + + ×
. 
Thus, we model the probability of success in subperiod 2 (the probability that 12 =Y ) 
conditional on the explanatory variables in subperiod 2, 2X , and the dependent variable in 
subperiod 1, 1Y . In addition, we include an interaction effect between d_SFS and 1Y , 
1_d SFS Y× . This interaction term allows the effect of SkatteFUNN to depend on whether the 
firm had patents/innovations in the previous subperiod (i.e., it depends on 1Y ). The validity of 
specification (2) rests on the assumption that the firms that obtained SkatteFUNN in period 2 
constitute a randomized sample from the population of all firms given the value of the 
independent variables 2X  and the lagged value of the dependent variable, 1Y . In other words, 
the SkatteFUNN firms are allowed to be a self-selected subsample based on the previous 
outcome of the dependent variable. 
Even if the conditional independence assumption behind (2) is weaker than for (1), it may not 
be valid. For example, it is invalidated if the decision to apply for SkatteFUNN (or to accept 
the application) is based on the (unobserved) probability of success of already ongoing projects. 
Thus, there may be reverse causality that cannot be accounted for simply by conditioning on 
the lagged dependent variable or other observed variables. 
To account for reverse causality, we propose a third, more elaborate, econometric specification, 
that generalizes (2) in two substantial ways. First, d_SFS is allowed to be endogenous in the 
sense that an unobserved variable that influences 2Y  may also influence the outcome of d_SFS. 
Second, we incorporate unobserved heterogeneity in the effects of SkatteFUNN by letting the 
coefficients of d_SFS — inclusive of the interaction terms — to be random coefficients (and 
hence vary across firms). This second feature of the model is motivated by a consideration of 
how SkatteFUNN may change a firm’s incentives for carrying out R&D activities: One way is, 
obviously, by reducing the marginal costs of R&D. Another way is by improving the liquidity 
of the firm. In the latter case, the tax credit may finance R&D investments that would have 
been profitable also in the absence of the scheme (see Hall (2002) for a discussion of the 
importance of financing constraints for R&D investments). The fact that most government 
revenue loss due to SkatteFUNN is in the form of payment of grants to firms that are not in a 
tax position, suggests that a firm’s liquidity situation is important for whether it chooses to 
16 
participate in the program or not8. In fact, firms that are not in a tax position are significantly 
over-represented among the SkatteFUNN firms, even when we control for a broad set of 
covariates, including industry dummies, firm age, operating margins and value added per man-
hour. Since a firm’s tax position is likely to be positively correlated with its access to funds, 
firms with poor liquidity seem to be over-represented among those who participate in 
SkatteFUNN. 
 
The above discussion motivates our choice to incorporate heterogeneous treatment effects in 
the third version of our econometric model. Then the average treatment effect on the treated — 
the average effect of SkatteFUNN on the firms that participate in the scheme — can be 
considered as a weighted average of 0 (the contribution from participants whose behavior is not 
affected) and the average effect among participants who increase their R&D as a result of the 
tax credit. On the other hand, firms that do not participate (“the control group”) do so because 
the scheme does not give them sufficient incentives to change their behavior. The latter group 
is clearly also heterogeneous, comprising e.g. firms whose demand for R&D is locally inelastic 
(possibly due to fixed costs or indivisibilities in R&D investments), and firms that do not 
bother to participate in SkatteFUNN even if they may be eligible for tax credits.9 
To present the third version of our model, let *X  be a continuous latent index, such that 
_ 1d SFS =  if the value of *X  is larger than 0: 
(3) 
*1 if >0 
_
0 else
X
d SFS = 

. 
Furthermore, assume that 
(4) * (1) (1)1X Z γ ε= + , 
where (1)Z  is a row-vector of exogenous or predetermined variables that determines the 
probability that _ 1d SFS = , 1γ  is a fixed vector of (unknown) parameters, and (1)ε  is normally 
                                                 
8 Since 2002, roughly 75 percent of the subsidies have been given as grants and this share has been a very stable feature of 
the scheme irrespective of business cycle fluctuations. 
9 In fact, about 41 percent of firms that reported positive R&D expenditure in 2004 did not apply for SkatteFUNN tax credits. 
This suggests that many firms do not bother to apply, even if they are eligible for tax credits. 
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distributed with expectation 0 and variance 1. The equations (3) and (4) thus represent a 
standard probit model for the binary dependent variable d_SFS. In our specification of (1)Z  we 
include all variables in tX  except the (endogenous) variables that involve d_SFS. In addition, 
we include regional dummies, the lagged innovation variable, 1Y , and a binary variable 
taxposition, which is 1 if the firm is in a tax position (i.e., pays taxes) in the beginning of 
subperiod 2 (i.e., in 2002). The variables in (1)Z  are thus as follows: 
(1)Z  = (1, dummies for employment intervals, industries and regions, ac, rk, coopf, coopu, 
taxposition, 1Y ). 
The outcome of the innovation variable 2Y , is also assumed to be determined by a probit 
model: 
(5) 
*
2
1 if >0 
0 else,
Y
Y = 

 
where 
(6) * (2) (2)2 ( )Y Z Sγ β η ε= + + + . 
In equation (6), (2)Z  includes the same variables as (1)Z , except taxposition and the regional 
dummies. That is 
(2)Z = (1, dummies for employment intervals and industries, ac, rk, coopf, coopu, 1Y ). 
Furthermore, the vector S contains the endogenous variables that involve d_SFS: 
S = (d_SFS, d_SFS × coopf, d_SFS × coopu, d_SFS × Y1). 
Moreover, 2γ  and β  are fixed regression coefficients, η  is a random coefficient vector with 
expected value 0, (2)ε  is an additive error term with expectation 0 and variance 1. The vector 
(1) (2)( , , ) 'ε ε η′  is assumed to have a multinormal distribution with expectation 0 and where η  
is independent of (1) (2)( , )ε ε  and (1)ε  and (2)ε both have variance 1 (to obtain identification). 
18 
Model (3)–(6) generalizes (2) in two important ways. First, the additive error term, (1)ε , in the 
equation that determines participation in SkatteFUNN, is allowed to be correlated with the 
additive error term, (2)ε , in the equation that determines the latent innovation variable *Y . 
Secondly, we allow for heterogeneity in the effects of the endogenous explanatory variables 
through the vector of random slope coefficients, η . 
Our a priori hypothesis (which will later be tested) is that the variable taxposition and the 
regional dummies do affect the participation in SkatteFUNN, but not the probability of 
innovations per se. Thus they can be excluded from (2)Z . The main rationale for the 
exclusion restriction with regard to taxposition is that, while financing constraints may restrict 
a firm’s innovation activities and its R&D investment in particular, it is not a production 
factor per se. That is, given the vector of productive inputs at the beginning of the three-year 
period (including R&D capital stock), information about the firm’s tax position should not 
help us to predict its innovation probability during the corresponding subperiod. With regard 
to the regional dummies, there is little reason a priori to believe that the regional 
heterogeneity has a direct effect on the probability of success of the research projects. The 
validity of our proposed exclusion restrictions is examined empirically in Section 5, where we 
conduct a “placebo-experiment”, using data for two 3-year subperiods prior to SkatteFUNN. 
If *Y  was a directly observable variable, Models (3)–(6) would be a special case of the 
general ordered probit model analyzed by Dagsvik et al. (2011), and estimation could be 
carried out by the maximum likelihood methods derived there. However, because *Y  is not 
observable — we only observe the binary variable 2Y  — the methods in Dagsvik et al. (2011) 
must be modified. Our approach consists of two steps. In step one we estimate the probit-
model (3)–(4) in the traditional way. In step two, given the estimates of 1γ  from the first step, 
we reformulate (6) in a way similar to that in Dagsvik et al. (2011)10: 
(7) * (2) *2 ( _ )Y S Z d SFSβ γ λ θ ε= + − + , 
                                                 
10  Equation (7) corresponds to equation (20) in Dagsvik et al. in the special case with 0ρ = : That is, no correlation between 
the random slope coefficients η and (1)ε . 
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where the error term *ε  has conditional expectation equal to 0 given (2)Z  and S. In (7), ρ  is 
an unknown parameter vector, θ  is an unknown parameter, and ( _ )d SFSλ  is an inverse 
Mills ratio (see, e.g., Heckman, 1976): 
(8) 
(1)
1
(1)
1
(1)
1
(1)
1
( ) if _ 0 
( )
( _ )
( ) if _ 1.
1 ( )
t
t
t
t
Z d SFS
Z
d SFS
Z d SFS
Z
φ γ
γ
λ
φ γ
γ
− = Φ −= 
− − =
 − Φ −
 
In (8), ( )φ ⋅  and ( )Φ ⋅ are the standard normal probability density and cumulative distribution 
functions, respectively. The parameter vector 1γ  is replaced by the corresponding estimate 
obtained in the first step when applying (8). By postulating a logistic distribution for *ε , we 
obtain a logit model for 2Y . The corresponding logit estimators of 2γ  and β can be 
interpreted as pseudo maximum likelihood estimators, cf. Gourieroux et al. (1984). 
5. Estimation results 
5.1 Which firms participate in the SkatteFUNN scheme? 
We consider first the estimation of the SkatteFUNN-participation equation (4). We next use 
the results of this estimation to calculate the function ( )λ ⋅  defined in (8), to estimate the 
innovation equation (7). The problems we address in this subsection have many similarities 
with Blanes and Busom (2004), who study participation in R&D subsidy programs for 
Spanish manufacturing firms. Like them, we include measures of the skill of the employees, 
lagged R&D activity, firm size and financing constraints as explanatory variables in the 
participation equation.  
The results in Table 4 show that the regional dummies South, West, and Mid-Norway are 
significant and have a positive sign (the coefficients of the capital region Oslo and the 
category of less than 10 employees11 are 0 a priori). The results are in line with a long 
tradition in Norway of taking regional considerations into account when deciding on policies, 
with a bias in favor of remote and sparsely populated regions. Although SkatteFUNN is open 
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to all firms, firms that apply for SkatteFUNN funding do so through the regional offices of 
Innovation Norway, which may differ in their ability to support firms in their application 
writing. Note, however, that Innovation Norway is only helping firms through the application 
process, and has no authority to approve the project.12  
From Table 4 we also observe a significant negative relation between SkatteFUNN and the 
variable taxposition. A plausible explanation, as suggested in our discussion in Section 4, is 
that participation in SkatteFUNN is motivated by the liquidity situation of the firm: If the firm 
is not in a tax position, the tax credit will be given as a grant and thus increases the firm’s 
cash holdings. SkatteFUNN is a more easily accessible source of cash than ordinary research 
grants, which was also the intension of the scheme from the start. Another explanation could 
be that taxposition is negatively correlated with the firm’s tax planning abilities, including 
knowledge about and active use of tax reducing schemes such as SkatteFUNN.13  
Finally, the results in Table 4 show that the dummy for lagged innovation activities, Y1, has a 
huge impact on participation in SkatteFUNN. Y1 is clearly the most significant variable in the 
table, so there is a strong persistence in the firms’ innovation activities. The share of man-
hours worked by persons with academic education, ac,, and both types of cooperation, coopf 
and coopu, have both large impacts on the participation probability. There is considerable 
heterogeneity across different industries, with firms from some of the manufacturing 
industries having, ceteris paribus, the highest probability of participating in SkatteFUNN. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
11 Firms with less than 10 employees may be included in the survey if they had at least 10 employees at the time of the 
sample selection, but they make up less than two percent of the observations. 
12 The project plan must be approved by the Research Council of Norway, while the final R&D expenditures have to be 
approved by the tax authorities, based on their own judgments and a statement from the applicant’s auditor. 
 
13 The latter interpretation was suggested to us by an accountant who had experience in auditing firms subsidized by the 
SkatteFUNN scheme. His experience with these firms was that they had somehow specialized in applying for government 
funds and that many of them had acquired skills in managing the bureaucracy involved.  
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Table 4. 
Probit estimates for the probability that d_SFS = 1. 
Explanatory variables ( (1)Z ) Estimate Std. Dev. 
10–19 employees (d) –0.36 0.23 
20–49 employees (d) –0.08 0.22 
50–99 employees (d) –0.10 0.22 
≥ 100 employees (d) –0.27 0.21 
Construction (d) 0.38 0.26 
Retail trade (d) 0.07 0.24 
Transport (d) –0.30 0.19 
Services (d) 0.55 0.18 
Industry A (Nace 15–16) (d) 0.65 0.18 
Industry BC (Nace 17–19) (d) 0.64 0.23 
Industry D (Nace 20) (d) 0.62 0.23 
Industry E (Nace 21–22) (d) 0.16 0.19 
Industry FGH (Nace 23–25) (d) 0.91 0.21 
Industry I (Nace 26) (d) 0.48 0.24 
Industry J (Nace 27–28) (d) 0.69 0.19 
Industry K (Nace 29) (d) 1.09 0.21 
Industry L (Nace 30–33) (d) 0.80 0.20 
Industry M (Nace 34–35) (d) 0.73 0.19 
Industry N (Nace 36–37) (d) 1.20 0.23 
East coast (d) 0.10 0.12 
East inland (d) 0.11 0.17 
South (d)  0.64 0.12 
West (d)  0.41 0.12 
Mid-Norway (d)  0.39 0.15 
North (d)  0.29 0.18 
ac 1.18 0.35 
rk 0.12 0.07 
coopf (d) 0.30 0.10 
coopu (d) 0.39 0.12 
taxposition (d) –0.16 0.07 
Y1 (lagged innovation) (d) 0.44 0.08 
constant 1.19 0.26 
Note: n = 1689; (d) indicates binary variable. There are seven main regions in Norway, where the capital region 
Oslo is made the reference; less than 10 employees is the reference category for the employment variable. 
 
5.2 Testing the validity of exclusion restrictions 
A key role in our strategy for identifying causal effects is assigned to variables that are 
contained in (1)Z , but not in (2)Z . These exclusion restrictions contribute to identifying the 
effects of participating in SkatteFUNN: For a given value of (2)Z , variation in the excluded 
variables contributes to exogenous variation in d_SFS. Our hypothesis is that taxposition and 
the regional dummies satisfy these criteria. This identification requires, of course, that 
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regional location and whether a firm is in a tax position or not, has no direct effect on the 
innovation probability, but do affect the SkatteFUNN participation probability. 
In view of the great importance attributed to the exclusion restrictions for identifying causal 
effects, it is a main feature of our data that we can actually test, at least partially, the validity 
of these restrictions. To do so, we utilize the innovation survey of 1999, which contains 
information about the outcome variables inpdt and inpcs (but not d_patent and inmar) for the 
three years up to 1999 — henceforth denoted subperiod 0. Thus we are able to estimate 
),|1Pr( 011 YXY = . That is, the conditional logit model defined in (2), with 1Y  as the outcome 
variable conditional on ),( 01 YX . Since there was no SkatteFUNN program before period 2, 
this estimation is equivalent to estimating the )|0Pr( )2(* ZY >  defined in (7), with 
0=== ξγβ . Moreover, when considering 1Y  as the outcome variable, we can include 
taxposition and all the regional dummies in )2(Z and test whether the corresponding 
parameters are zero. This can be considered as a “placebo experiment”. The results are shown 
in Table 5. 
Table 5. 
Testing exclusion restrictions regarding taxposition and the regional dummies. Dependent 
variable: 1Y . Subperiod t=0 corresponds to three year period up to 1998. 
Explanatory variables ( (1)Z ) 
New product for the firm (d) New production process (d) 
Est. Std. Dev. Est. Std. Dev. 
coopf (d) 0.68 0.29 0.86 0.32 
coopu (d) 0.54 1.14 0.64 0.36 
East coast (d)  0.36  0.28 –0.26 0.29 
East inland (d) –0.41 0.42 –0.47 0.53 
South (d)  –0.46 0.29 –0.17 0.30 
West (d)  –0.19 0.27 –0.65 0.41 
Mid–Norway (d) –0.24 0.38 –0.64 0.95 
North (d)  –1.00 0.40 –1.46 0.68 
ac 0.30 1.05 1.59 1.09 
rk 2.00 0.50 0.40 0.27 
0Y  (d) 1.97 0.20  1.45 0.25 
taxposition (d) –0.08 0.17  –0.09 0.21 
Note: n = 1770; (d) indicates binary variable. Size and industry dummies are included in the analyses, but the 
corresponding parameter estimates are not reported here. 
 
We see from Table 5 that all the regional dummies, except North, are clearly insignificant in 
both innovation equations and can be excluded. This result is also confirmed when carrying 
out a joint likelihood ratio test. However, North cannot be excluded according to these results, 
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and we decided to include North as an explanatory variable in our subsequent analyses, thus 
extending the variable list in (2)Z . Moreover, Table 4 shows that South, West and Mid-
Norway are relevant, and therefore contribute to exogenous variation in d_SFS.  
It is also confirmed in Table 5 that taxposition has no significant effect on the probability of 
innovating, with an estimate close to zero in both equations. Thus, whereas taxposition can be 
excluded from the innovation equation in view of the results in Table 5, it is clearly a relevant 
variable in view of the results in Table 4.  
5.3 Estimation results for innovations and patents 
Tables 6–9 present the results for the four different dependent variables and three different 
versions of our econometric model. The tables focus on the most important explanatory 
variables. We do not report results for control variables such as firm size and industry. Our 
estimates regarding these variables are in line with results well established elsewhere in the 
empirical literature: large firms (with many employees) have a higher probability of patenting 
or innovating than other firms, cf. Griffith et al. (2006), while manufacturing industries are 
those with the highest probability of having patent applications and innovations. Based on the 
results in Table 5, where the exclusion restriction regarding the dummy North was firmly 
rejected, this variable is included among the explanatory variables and reported in Tables 6-9. 
The result regarding North is in line with the findings reported in Table 5: the propensity to 
innovate is generally lower in the most northern region. 
Table 6 shows the results for patents. We first note that the estimated coefficient of the time 
dummy of the second period is lower than for the first one in the (standard) logit model. This 
corresponds to an approximately 10 percent drop in total patent applications in Norway 
between these two subperiods. In the standard logit model, the share of employees with 
academic education, ac, and R&D capital intensity, rk, are also highly significant explanatory 
variables. This result is typical in the literature; cf. Crepon et al. (1998), Parisi et al. (2006), 
and Griffith et al. (2006). 
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Table 6. 
Binary regression. Dependent variable: Yt = “d_patent” (patents). 
Explanatory variables logit conditional logit  
conditional logit  
with selection 
Est. Std. Dev. Est. Std. Dev. Est. Std. Dev. a 
1999–2001 (d) –3.45 0.40 – – – – 
2002–2004 (d) –3.55 0.40 –3.55 0.51 –4.12 0.77 
North (d) –1.55 0.67 –1.05 0.57 –0.84 0.86 
ac 2.39 0.47 0.75 0.88 0.51 0.94 
rk 0.80 0.11 0.37 0.16 0.27 0.22 
coopf (d) 0.62 0.13 0.43 0.22 0.49 0.24 
coopu (d) 0.80 0.14 0.61 0.26 0.80 0.27 
d_SFS (d) 0.24 0.23 0.44 0.30 1.10 1.18 
d_SFS × coopf (d) 0.31 0.24 0.24 0.30 0.23 0.31 
d_SFS × coopu (d) 0.15 0.22 0.10 0.29 0.05 0.29 
d_SFS × Yt-1 (d) – – 0.07 0.35 0.16 0.40 
Yt-1 (d) – – 2.54 0.26 2.54 0.31 
Corr( (1)ε , (2)ε ) – – – – 0.12 (0.05) 
Note: Logit n = 2467; conditional logit n = 1527; (d) indicates binary variable; dummies for size and industry 
are included as regressors, but the corresponding parameter estimates are not reported here. 
a Std. Dev. calculated conditional on the step-1 estimates. 
 
The coefficient of d_SFS is not significant in any of the three model specifications reported in 
Table 6. However, a joint hypothesis of whether all the parameters involving SkatteFUNN-
variables are zero is rejected in the standard logit model, with a p-value of 0.01. The 
conditional logit model that allows d_SFS to be endogenous (cf. the column named 
“conditional logit with selection”) gives estimates for the effect of SkatteFUNN that are less 
significant than in the simple conditional logit model. For example, a joint test that d_SFS has 
zero effect on patenting yields a p-value of 0.63. Thus there is no evidence that the 
SkatteFUNN scheme affects the probability of patent applications. We also see that by 
conditioning on lagged innovations, Yt-1, much of the explanatory power of rk and ac 
disappears compared to the standard logit model. Our result on the significance of persistence 
in patenting contradicts results in Geroski et al (1997) and Malerba and Orsenigo (1999) who 
find no persistence in patenting. On the other hand, the dummies for cooperation coopf and 
coopu are highly significant in all the three model variants, especially cooperation with a 
research institute (coopu).  
We see that the estimated correlation between (1)ε  and (2)ε , i.e., the residual terms of the 
SkatteFUNN participation equation and the patent application equation, is positive (0.12) and 
significant at the 5 percent level. Thus there is clear evidence of self-selection and 
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endogeneity. The corresponding (positive) correlation is even stronger in the case of the 
innovations reported in Tables 7–9, ranging from 0.22 to 0.34.  
Table 7. 
Binary regression. Dependent variable: Yt = “inpdt” (new product for the firm).  
Explanatory variables  logit conditional logit  
conditional logit 
with selection 
Est. Std. Dev. Est. Std. Dev. Est. Std. Dev.a 
1999–2001 (d) –1.44 0.28 – – – – 
2002–2004 (d) –2.07 0.28 –2.93 0.47 –2.72 0.53 
North (d) –1.61 0.52 –1.21 0.47 –1.12 0.52 
ac 1.12 0.45 1.60 0.71 2.30 0.82 
rk 0.70 0.17 –0.01 0.14 –0.02 0.17 
coopf (d) 1.19 0.12 0.47 0.21 0.53 0.22 
coopu (d) 0.67 0.14 0.23 0.26 0.27 0.28 
d_SFS (d) 1.52 0.17 1.68 0.22 1.48 0.86 
d_SFS × coopf (d) 0.19 0.21 0.48 0.25 0.44 0.27 
d_SFS × coopu (d) –0.03 0.23 0.17 0.27 0.07 0.29 
d_SFS × Yt-1 (d) – – –0.92 0.28 –1.20 0.31 
Yt-1 (d) – – 1.91 0.17 2.32 0.25 
Corr( (1)ε , (2)ε ) – – – – 0.34 (0.06) 
Note: Logit n = 2467; conditional logit n = 1484; (d) indicates binary variable; dummies for size and industry 
are included as regressors, but the corresponding parameter estimates are not reported here. 
a Std. Dev. calculated conditional on the step-1 estimates. 
 
Examining the results for innovations reported in Tables 7–9, one can observe a general 
pattern for all three types of innovations. From the standard logit model we find that the share 
of academics (ac) and R&D capital per man-hour (rk) are highly significant variables. In the 
two conditional logit models, however, we find no significant impact of rk on the probability 
of innovating. The explanation may be that the value of the lagged dependent variable 1tY −  
also incorporates the effect of rk, because these variables are highly correlated, as is evident 
from the standard logit model. Again, we find that the coefficient of 1tY −  is highly significant 
and positive and of a similar magnitude in the two conditional models. For all innovation 
types, we find that cooperation with another firm (coopf) is a significant explanatory variable 
in contrast to the case of patenting, where coopu (cooperation with a research institute) is 
more influential. This difference may reflect that innovations in general are “closer to the 
market” than patenting, where academically oriented collaboration is more important, cf. 
Mairesse and Mohnen (2010) who report similar findings in their survey. 
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Table 8. 
Binary regression. Dependent variable: Yt = “inmar” (new product for the market). 
 Explanatory variables logit conditional logit  
conditional logit 
with selection 
Est. Std. Dev. Est. Std. Dev. Est. Std. Dev.a 
1999–2001 (d) –3.21 0.31 – – – – 
2002–2004 (d) –3.05 0.32 –3.67 0.47 –3.52 0.55 
North (d) –1.96 0.46 –1.36 0.58 –1.46 0.72 
ac 1.49 0.38 1.34 0.62 1.73 0.73 
rk 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.14 0.18 0.15 
coopf (d) 0.87 0.11 0.57 0.19 0.61 0.50 
coopu (d) 0.60 0.13 0.43 0.23 0.72 0.46 
d_SFS (d) 1.25 0.16 1.51 0.20 1.10 0.84 
d_SFS × coopf (d) 0.10 0.18 0.13 0.21 0.11 0.24 
d_SFS × coopu (d) 0.10 0.19 0.15 0.22 0.16 0.25 
d_SFS × Yt-1 (d) – – –1.16 0.29 –1.30 0.34 
Yt-1 (d) – – 2.09 0.21 2.39 0.27 
Corr( (1)ε , (2)ε ) – – – – 0.25 (0.05) 
Note: Logit n = 2467; conditional logit n = 1484; (d) indicates binary variable; dummies for size and industry 
are included as regressors, but the corresponding parameter estimates are not reported here. 
a Std. Dev. calculated conditional on the step-1 estimates. 
 
The SkatteFUNN dummy is clearly significant in the standard logit and conditional logit 
models, but the results with regard to d_SFS are ambiguous in the model where it is allowed 
to be endogenous. Then the coefficient of d_SFS is significant at the 5 percent level in the 
case of a new production process and 10 percent level in the case of a new product for the 
firm. The interaction effect between d_SFS and cooperation with another firm (d_SFS × 
coopf) is significant at the 10 percent level both in the conditional logit model and the 
conditional model with selection in the case of a new product for the firm, but is far from 
being significant with regard to the other types of innovations. The estimated interaction 
effect d_SFS × Yt-1 is negative and significant in both the conditional models: if the firm was 
innovating before getting a SkatteFUNN subsidy, the effect of SkatteFUNN is weaker. 
Likelihood ratio tests of the joint hypothesis that all the variables involving d_SFS have 
corresponding coefficients equal to zero (4 degrees of freedom in the standard logit model, 
and 5 degrees of freedom in the conditional logit models) were clearly rejected in all the 
model variants, with p-values close to zero. 
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Table 9. 
Binary regression. Dependent variable: Yt = “inpcs” (new production process). 
Explanatory variables logit conditional logit  
conditional logit 
with selection 
Est. Std. Dev. Est. Std. Dev. Est. Std. Dev.a 
1999–2001 (d) –1.71 0.27 – – – – 
2002–2004 (d) –2.44 0.28 –2.57 0.45 –3.71 0.54 
North (d) –1.62 0.40 –1.06 0.52 –1.60 0.72 
ac 0.60 0.39 0.65 0.58 1.42 1.13 
rk 0.12 0.09 –0.09 0.12 0.12 0.14 
coopf (d) 0.85 0.11 0.47 0.18 0.61 0.20 
coopu (d) 0.63 0.13 0.43 0.21 0.47 0.26 
d_SFS (d) 1.27 0.16 1.44 0.19 1.88 0.87 
d_SFS × coopf (d) –0.01 0.18 0.15 0.21 0.13 0.24 
d_SFS × coopu (d) –0.14 0.19 –0.10 0.22 0.15 0.25 
d_SFS × Yt-1 (d) – – –0.98 0.24 –1.30 0.34 
Yt-1 (d) – – 1.81 0.17 2.31 0.25 
Corr( (1)ε , (2)ε ) – – – – 0.22 (0.04) 
Note: Logit n = 2467; conditional logit n = 1484; (d) indicates binary variable; dummies for size and industry 
are included as regressors, but the corresponding parameter estimates are not reported here. 
a Std. Dev. calculated conditional on the step-1 estimates. 
 
From the highly significant coefficient estimate of the lagged dependent variable, Yt-1, for all 
four types of innovation (see Tables 6–9) we can infer that innovation is a rather persistent 
characteristic of a firm. This is illustrated by the estimated conditional probabilities of 
innovation in Table 10 (based on the results reported in Tables 6–9). For example, the 
conditional probability of patenting in subperiod t, given that the firm applied for a patent in 
subperiod t–1, is 0.54 (S.E. = 0.05) if d_SFS = 0 and 0.74 (S.E. = 0.03) if d_SFS = 1. The 
corresponding numbers when 1 0tY − = , i.e., the firm did not apply for patents in subperiod t-1, 
are much smaller: 0.04 (S.E. = 0.01) and 0.10 (S.E. = 0.01), respectively. For other types of 
innovation we observe the same pattern. Apparently, Table 10 shows that SkatteFUNN has a 
huge positive effect on the probability of innovating. However, the pairwise differences 
obtained by comparing d_SFS = 0 with d_SFS = 1 cannot be interpreted as effects of 
SkatteFUNN, because they reflect a gross effect — firms with d_SFS = 1 have, on average, 
different values for the other explanatory variables in tX , which have been “marginalized 
out” to obtain the estimated conditional probabilities reported in Table 10.14 
                                                 
14 If Z denotes the vector of variables that are “marginalized out”, then, for example: 
1 1 1Pr( 1 | 1, _ 0) Pr( 1 | 1, _ 0, ) Pr( | 1, _ 0)t t t t t
z
Y Y d SFS Y Y d SFS Z z Z z Y d SFS− − −= = = = = = = = = = =∑ . 
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Let us now look at the (more interesting) estimates for the partial effects of SkatteFUNN on 
the different types of product and process innovations. We will restrict this part of the analysis 
to the model with selection specified in Equations (5)–(8), where d_SFS is specified as an 
endogenous variable, and to two types of innovations: a new product for the firm and a new 
production process. For only these types of innovations, we clearly reject the joint hypothesis 
that all the variables involving d_SFS have zero coefficients. 
Table 10. 
Estimated probabilities of innovation conditional on previous innovation activity and 
participation in SkatteFUNN.a 
 Type of innovation 
Probability Patent (d) 
New product 
for the firm 
(d) 
New product 
for the market 
(d) 
New 
production 
process (d) 
Pr(Yt = 1| Yt–1 = 1, d_SFS = 0) 0.54 0.65 0.61 0.56 
Pr(Yt = 1| Yt–1 = 1, d_SFS = 1) 0.74 0.90 0.79 0.74 
Pr(Yt = 1| Yt–1 = 0, d_SFS = 0) 0.03 0.16 0.10 0.14 
Pr(Yt = 1| Yt–1 = 0, d_SFS = 1) 0.10 0.66 0.48 0.49 
Note: (d) indicates binary variable 
a Based on conditional logit with selection. 
 
Estimates of the partial effects of SkatteFUNN subsidies on the probability of a new product 
for the firm are presented in part (1) of Table 11. We see that a significant positive effect is 
found only for firms that did not innovate in the previous subperiod and cooperated with 
another firm. For example, for a representative firm with such cooperation and no innovation 
in the previous subperiod (and average values of all other variables), the effect of a change in 
the value of d_SFS from 0 to 1is given by a logit coefficient of 1.92 (S.E. = 0.90).15 This 
change increases the probability of a new product for the firm by 0.26 from 0.16 (see Table 7 
and Table 11). In the case of cooperation with both, i.e., another firm and a research institute, 
this probability increases by 0.27. On the other hand, if the firm, ceteris paribus, had such an 
innovation in the previous subperiod, the effect of SkatteFUNN becomes insignificant. 
The partial effects of SkatteFUNN subsidies on the probability of a new production process 
are presented in part (2) of Table 11. We see that these effects are highly dependent on the 
lagged dependent variable, 1tY − . For a firm with no cooperation and no process innovations in 
the previous subperiod, the estimated effect is given by a logit coefficient of 1.88 (S.E. = 
                                                 
15 Formally, this is the change in the log odds ln( /(1 ))p p− , where p is the probability of innovation. 
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0.87), which is significant at the 5 percent level. For a representative firm, this means an 
increase in the probability of a process innovation equal to 0.23 (from 0.14) as a result of the 
SkatteFUNN subsidy (see Table 9 and Table 11). If the firm also cooperated with another 
firm or a research institute the probability of a process innovation increases by 0.24 (and by 
0.26 in the case of cooperation with both another firm and a research institute). On the other 
hand, if the firm, ceteris paribus, had innovations in the previous subperiod, none of the 
partial effects are significant. 
Table 11.  
Partial effects of SkatteFUNN on the probability of innovating (new product for the firm and 
process innovation).a 
 (1) New product for the firm (d) (2) New production process (d) 
Conditional on Share of obs. 
Estimated 
logit 
Std. 
Dev. 
Changes in 
probability 
Share 
of obs. 
Estimated 
logit 
Std. 
Dev. 
Changes in 
probability 
Yt–1 =0,coopf =0,coopu =0 0.48 1.48 0.86 0.20 0.52 1.88 0.87 0.23 
Yt–1 =0,coopf =1,coopu =0 0.02 1.92 0.90 0.26 0.03 2.01 0.90 0.24 
Yt–1 =0,coopf =0,coopu =1 0.22 1.55 0.91 0.21 0.18 2.03 0.91 0.24 
Yt–1 =0,coopf =1,coopu =1 0.04 1.99 0.95 0.27 0.04 2.16 0.94 0.26 
Yt–1 =1,coopf =0,coopu =0 0.03 0.28 0.91 0.06 0.06 0.58 0.93 0.14 
Yt–1 =1,coopf =1,coopu =0 0.01 0.72 0.95 0.16 0.02 0.71 0.96 0.17 
Yt–1 =1,coopf =0,coopu =1 0.11 0.35 0.96 0.08 0.08 0.73 0.97 0.18 
Yt–1 =1,coopf =1,coopu =1 0.07 0.79 1.00 0.17 0.06 0.86 1.00 0.21 
Note: (d) indicates binary variable. The change in probability is calculated for a representative firm in the 
corresponding group. 
a Based on conditional logit with selection. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have studied how the Norwegian R&D tax credit scheme, SkatteFUNN, has 
affected firms’ innovation activities. Our results imply that the SkatteFUNN scheme 
contributes to the development of new production processes and to a lesser extent to new 
products for the firm. Firms that collaborate with other firms are more likely to have 
successful innovations. However, the scheme does not appear to contribute significantly to 
innovations in the form of new products for the market or to patenting. 
Our findings are based on an elaborate empirical model which controls for self-selection and 
endogeneity in a two-equation setup: one SkatteFUNN participation-equation and one 
innovation outcome-equation. The model also allows for firm specific heterogeneity in the 
effects of participating in the tax credit scheme. One important advantage of our data is the 
possibility to test the exclusion restrictions used in order to identify causal effects of 
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SkatteFUNN on innovations. For that purpose we used the innovation survey from the 3-year 
period preceding SkatteFUNN. 
Our analyses demonstrated that controlling for self-selection has a huge impact on the 
conclusions. If we had based our inference on models that do not take self-selection into 
account, thus implicitly assuming selection based on observables, the conclusions would have 
been much more positive with regard to the effects of the tax credit scheme. 
The finding that the SkatteFUNN scheme stimulates innovations in the form of new products 
for the firm and new production processes, but not major product innovations, suggests that 
the scheme does not stimulate innovations that may create significant spillovers among the 
firms. If we take into account that the majority of firms that are subsidized through the 
scheme are SMEs, our results may not come as a surprise. The scheme targets firms with little 
or no previous record of R&D activities as the marginal cost of R&D is lowered by the tax 
credit only for firms whose R&D spending would be below the cap in the absence of the 
scheme. On the other hand, for firms that usually undertake R&D of some size, the scheme 
mainly offers a (fairly small) subsidy to average R&D. Since the probability of a process 
innovation relative to that of a product innovation (i.e., a new product to the market) is 
highest in the first group, it is not surprising that the scheme favours process innovations over 
product innovations.  
 
For stimulation of major product innovations, other research policy instruments such as grants 
from the Research Council of Norway are probably more relevant. It has been argued, cf. 
Narula (2002), that the Norwegian innovation system has been built around large firms 
engaged in traditional, more mature resource intensive industries. Smaller firms operating 
outside these industries have less access to outside funding and the tax credit scheme could be 
interpreted as an attempt to reduce this lock-in. More generally, the idea that governments 
should adapt a mix of policies to foster innovation has been suggested by Mohnen and Röller 
(2005). 
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